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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is an old joke, popularized by Stephen Hawking in A Brief History 
of Time, which involved a well-known scientist who gave a lecture on 
astronomy:  
He described how the earth orbits around the sun and how the sun, in turn, 
orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called our galaxy. At the 
end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: 
“What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported 
on the back of a giant tortoise.” The scientist gave a superior smile before 
replying, “What is the tortoise standing on?” “You’re very clever, young 
man, very clever,” said the old lady. “But it’s turtles all the way down!”1 
The question before us is the influence of tort law on the interpretation of 
the anti-discrimination statutes, and I’ll spare the reader an historical exegesis 
that might lead us to conclude that it’s torts all the way down.2 However 
maybe the broader point is that it’s law all the way down, and that our current 
                                                                                                                     
 * Andrea J. Catania Endowed Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. B.A., Siena 
College, 1965; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1968. I thank my coauthors, Michael J. 
Zimmer and Rebecca Hanner White for their graciousness in permitting me to draw on 
their work. I am especially appreciative to Brian Sheppard for bearing with my rambles on 
this subject and to Mike Zimmer for his suggestions. 
 1 STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (1988). 
 2 What we now call contract law (whose origins trace back to the writ of assumpsit, 
creating a more general avenue to enforce promises than the writs of covenant and debt) 
developed out of what we now call tort law (the writ of trespass on the case). See 1 E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.6, at 17–22 (3d ed. 2004) 
(explaining how assumpsit developed out of the trespass on the case, first reaching 
“misfeasance” in the performance of one’s undertaking and ultimately reaching 
“nonfeasance”).  
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system of categorizing legal doctrines into neat subject matters may be due 
more to our need to teach law students pieces of the so-called seamless web 
than to any natural cleavages in intellectual discourse.3 
In other words, any legal inquiry can draw on only a limited number of 
concepts, and there is a natural tendency to analogize to concepts with which 
the attorney or judicial mind is familiar. It may be that the tendency can be 
overdone, but it is not because “torts” (or any other system of doctrine) has 
nothing to offer outside the sphere for which it was invented. The real problem 
for interpreting the anti-discrimination statutes is not that the Court is looking 
to tort law; rather, the problems are the Court’s choice of what tort law to look 
to and its failure to adapt tort doctrine to the goals of the anti-discrimination 
laws. 
II. IS THERE A TORT PROBLEM? 
Admittedly, tort law seems to have a special resonance in these inquiries, 
although, as will be developed, there is a strong argument to be made that 
judicial borrowing from agency law is at least as problematic. 
In any event, as developed in the scholarship,4 recent decisions have 
looked to tort principles of causation for the link between the prohibited 
                                                                                                                     
 3 There is, admittedly, a core to Contracts (enforcing promises) and to Torts 
(unhelpfully defined as a civil wrong that is not a breach of contract), but the doctrinal 
“packages” reflected in those terms are blurred and contested, certainly at the margins. 
While there are Restatements of Contract and of Torts (or at least, most recently, of pieces 
of Torts), there are also Restatements—some would say mishmashes—of less doctrinal 
subjects. Most obviously, the pending Restatement of Employment Law (Proposed Final 
Draft, April 18, 2014) comprises both pure contracts (e.g., oral and written promises of job 
security, noncompetition agreements.) and pure torts (public policy tort, defamation, 
invasion of privacy). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
(Proposed Final Draft 2014). But it also embraces doctrines of uncertain provenance: is the 
duty of loyalty a kind of implied-in-fact contract or something akin to negligence’s duty of 
care? And it does not take much excavation to show that, even in the iconic Restatements, 
there were efforts to patrol the borders of the discipline marked out by the American Law 
Institute (ALI). One example is the debate whether “promissory estoppel” was 
“contractual” or was better viewed as a species of quasi-contract. See 4 AM. LAW INST., 
PROCEEDINGS AT FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, app. at 112 (1926).  
MR. COUDERT: Could not an injustice be done by placing these in the category of 
quasi contracts rather than trying to twist the facts into a contract in order to do justice 
where it won’t always work out justice? 
 
MR. WILLISTON: What has that to do with the cases I have cited? They are not 
based on quasi contract, they are based on the idea of enforcing the promises that are 
made.  
Id. 
 4 See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and 
Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 34; Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 U. 
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motive and the adverse employment action,5 and, more radically, transplanted 
“proximate cause” from negligence law to the intentional “tort” of disparate 
treatment discrimination.6 In both cases, the doctrines were deployed to limit 
liability. However, we should not forget the dog that didn’t bark—there are 
numerous employment discrimination doctrines that do not derive from tort 
law,7 and tort analysis has sometimes been used to assist plaintiffs. For 
example, Professor William Corbett argues that the McDonnell Douglas 
structure, whatever its currently recognized limitations, is a kind of res ipsa 
loquitur analysis that may have been invoked to improve plaintiffs’ proof 
prospects.8 And the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act9 can be thought of as having 
deployed the “discovery” rule from tort law10 to expand the limitations periods 
of the anti-discrimination statutes.11 
Whether this makes employment discrimination tort-centric,12 I leave to 
others, but looking to tort law is not limited to the anti-discrimination statutes. 
After all, the Court sometimes speaks of “statutory torts,”13 and often of 
                                                                                                                     
FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1052‒53 (2014); Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment 
Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1432–33 (2012). 
 5 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009); see also Vance v. 
Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2451–52 (2013) (applying Gross analysis to retaliation 
cases under Title VII). 
 6 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192, 1194 (2011).  
 7 Martha Chamallas, Beneath the Surface of Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 527, 
539–40 (2013) (“Despite recent talk of the tortification of Title VII, the ban against 
individual liability stands as a testament to the un-tort-like status and history of Title VII.”) 
(footnote omitted)). Further, sexual harassment, for example, is the only “tort” for which 
the tortfeasor is not liable even though his or her employer is. See Pink v. Modoc Indian 
Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 8 William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let 
Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 493 (2013) (“If the 
Court believed that employment discrimination was common enough that judges were 
willing to infer discrimination from a flimsy prima facie case and a showing of pretext, 
then res ipsa should have functioned well enough in helping plaintiffs present cases based 
on circumstantial evidence.”). 
 9 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 10 E.g., Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 306 P.3d 1264, 1274 (Alaska 2013) 
(“The common-law discovery rule tolls the running of an applicable statute of limitations 
‘[w]here an element of a cause of action is not immediately apparent.’ It ‘developed as a 
means to mitigate the harshness that can result from the [accrual] rule’s preclusion of 
claims where the injury provided insufficient notice of the cause of action to the 
plaintiff.’”) (citations omitted)). 
 11 See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499, 549‒54 (2010). 
 12 See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705, 713‒22 (2014).  
 13 The first instance is Justice Brandeis in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, and 
his language drew an explicit parallel: “Workmen’s compensation acts are treated, almost 
universally, as creating a statutory relation between the parties—not, like employer’s 
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“constitutional torts,” the latter when it is describing private causes of action 
seeking damages for violations of constitutional provisions, either in Bivens 
claims14 or in § 1983 actions.15 It could as easily speak of “constitutional 
claims,” but the tort label is frequently used by the Supreme Court and is 
pervasive in the commentary.16 Admittedly, the tort analogy in this context 
seems often invoked to justify some limitation on the cause of action, often by 
recognizing an immunity.17 
                                                                                                                     
liability acts, as substituting a statutory tort for a common law tort.” 286 U.S. 145, 157–58 
(1932). For later uses describing either state or federal claims, see Town of Castle Rock, 
Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 769 n.15 (2005) (“The state cases cited by the dissent that 
afford a cause of action for police failure to enforce restraining orders vindicate state 
common-law or statutory tort claims—not procedural due process claims under the Federal 
Constitution.”) (citations omitted)); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 
863 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (explaining that § 43 of the Lanham Act “goes beyond 
§ 32 in making certain types of unfair competition federal statutory torts”) (quoting Ives 
Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 419 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“This decision seems to me to so confuse maritime law with common and statutory tort 
law as to destroy the integrity of the former as a separate system based on the peculiarities 
and risks of seagoing labor.”). 
 14 The Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
recognized a private right of action against federal officers for victims of a Fourth 
Amendment violation. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). It did not use the term “constitutional 
tort,” but that label has since been often applied to Bivens-type claims. See Corr. Servs. 
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 73 (2001). Such “direct” constitutional suits have been 
recognized under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 228, 230 (1979), and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 (1980). As the Malesko Court wrote, 
“[s]ince Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context 
or new category of defendants.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68. Further, a number of the Court’s 
decisions in the Bivens line have limited the reach of the doctrine. See Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994) (repeatedly using the term “constitutional 
tort” while disallowing a Bivens claim against a federal agency); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
487 U.S. 412, 414 (1988) (holding that improper denial of Social Security disability 
benefits, even if resulting from violations of due process by government officials, did not 
give rise to a Bivens action in light of the “elaborate remedial scheme devised by 
Congress”). 
 15 See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (“Congress 
adopted this common-law system of recovery when it established liability for 
‘constitutional torts.’”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 417 n.10 (1976) 
(explaining that §1983 was intended to create “a species of tort liability” in favor of 
persons who are deprived of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured” to them by the 
Constitution).  
 16 E.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 
262 (2000); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory 
Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 284 (2010); Christina Whitman, 
Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 10 (1980). 
 17 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982) (establishing qualified 
immunity for presidential aides); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–31 (recognizing prosecutorial 
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That said, neither the description of the cause of action as tort-like nor the 
resort to insights provided by tort law strikes me as, per se, problematic. In 
approaching statutory enactments, like the anti-discrimination laws, the courts 
have a host of concepts to draw on in interpreting statutory language, which 
results in multiple possible readings. The question is not whether tort law 
provides a source of inspiration but, rather, how apt the application is. Justice 
Souter captured my view in Hartman v. Moore, a case involving alleged 
retaliatory prosecution, with the issue being “whether the closer common-law 
analog to retaliatory prosecution is malicious prosecution (with its no-
probable-cause element) or abuse of process (without it).”18 He wrote: 
As for the invitation to rely on common-law parallels, we certainly are 
ready to look at the elements of common-law torts when we think about 
elements of actions for constitutional violations . . . but the common law is 
best understood here more as a source of inspired examples than of 
prefabricated components of Bivens torts.19  
He then applied a functional analysis closely linked to the rationale for the 
violation in choosing to require a plaintiff to prove that that the prosecution 
lacked probable cause as an element of the claim.20 While not a plaintiff-
friendly result, the analysis was not a blind application of proffered tort 
analogies. Thus, I take more seriously the critiques of the how the law of torts 
is applied than looking to torts in the first place.21 
III. OR A STATUTORY INTERPRETATION PROBLEM? 
But resort to tort (or contract or antitrust or anything else), is permissible 
(in theory at least) only when Congress has not carefully enough defined the 
parameters of the inquiry. In some cases, Congress may constrain the 
judiciary—either adopting in some relatively explicit way a concept used 
elsewhere or defining a term so precisely that competing definitions are 
excluded. But rarely does Congress speak so clearly, leaving the courts free to 
pick and choose among potentially applicable concepts. Some seem so 
                                                                                                                     
immunity in a § 1983 suit); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266‒67 (1978) 
(requiring a showing of actual damages from a denial of due process). 
 18 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 258 (2006). 
 19 Id. (citation omitted). 
 20 Id. at 265–66 (“In sum, the complexity of causation in a claim that prosecution was 
induced by an official bent on retaliation should be addressed specifically in defining the 
elements of the tort. Probable cause or its absence will be at least an evidentiary issue in 
practically all such cases. Because showing an absence of probable cause will have high 
probative force, and can be made mandatory with little or no added cost, it makes sense to 
require such a showing as an element of a plaintiff’s case, and we hold that it must be 
pleaded and proven.”). 
 21 See Chamallas, supra note 7, at 539‒41; Corbett, supra note 8, at 492‒506. 
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pervasive that there can be little doubt that Congress “intended” them to apply. 
Others are fairly contestable.  
An example might help. Take the remedies section, § 706(g)(1), of Title 
VII, which, as originally enacted, provided: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is 
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the 
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such 
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring 
of employees, with or without back pay. . . . Interim earnings or amounts 
earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated 
against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.22 
This passage bristles with terms whose meaning could be viewed as being 
drawn from earlier law. The court “may enjoin” the proven unlawful practice, 
which draws on the equity law of injunctions. But proof of a violation of 
whatever right was at issue did not, in equity, necessarily lead to an 
injunction,23 and Congress’s use of “may” (rather than “must”) reinforces the 
notion that the decision to enjoin is not automatic.  
Further, the language clearly authorizes a court to order a defendant to do 
something, not merely to cease doing something. The power to order positive 
relief is made even clearer by the reference to “reinstatement or hiring of 
employees.” Like Title VII, equity allowed both mandatory and prohibitory 
orders,24 but equity had generally refused to specifically enforce personal service 
contracts. While most of the decisions in this regard came from refusals to order 
employees to specifically perform,25 there were cases rejecting suits requiring 
employers to keep employees in service.26 Thus, Title VII’s express authorization 
of instatement or reinstatement may have been critical to ensure that such relief is 
available. However, the statute does not tell us when hiring or reinstatement is 
appropriate, which would seem to permit—if not encourage—courts to look to 
more general equitable principles for guidance.  
                                                                                                                     
 22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012). The 1972 Amendments added some provisions, 
including authorization of “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,” 
providing that “[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior 
to the filing of a charge” of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. The 1991 amendments 
moved the amended language into subsection (g)(1) when Congress added (g)(2) to the 
paragraph. See id. § 2000e-5(g). 
 23 See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.9(2), 
at 228–30 (2d ed. 1993). 
 24 Id. § 2.9(1), at 224. 
 25 3 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 12.22(2), at 496–98.  
 26 Id. § 12.21(4), at 489–90. Even today, fifty years after Title VII’s enactment, equity 
may well be barred from requiring the employment of individuals when there is no 
statutory violation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 9.04, 9.06 
(Proposed Final Draft 2014). 
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In any event, because reinstatement can be “with . . . backpay,”27 Congress 
also authorized a monetary remedy—although the remedy seems limited, else 
Congress would have used “compensatory damages” rather than backpay.28 
But what is “backpay” in the first place? After fifty years, the answer is fairly 
clear;29 however, the early Title VII courts had to look somewhere for 
guidance, and an obvious source is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
given that the remedial language of Title VII somewhat tracks the remedies 
provisions of the NLRA. These provisions authorize the National Labor 
Relations Board (Board), upon finding a violation, to issue an order requiring 
the violator “to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take 
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without 
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this [Act].”30 Perhaps Congress 
wanted the courts to look to NLRA’s jurisprudence over the previous thirty 
years of Board and court decisions in determining whether backpay under 
Title VII includes straight salary, benefits, overtime, vacation pay, or all of the 
above.31 Or perhaps there are differences between the NLRA and Title VII 
that counsel against such borrowing.32 
                                                                                                                     
 27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 
 28 Congress presumably chose backpay rather than compensatory damages to 
maximize the chances that the award could be made by a judge rather than a jury: In 1964, 
entrusting enforcement to Southern juries might well have resulted in effective nullification 
of the statute. See Matthew F. Davis, Comment, Beyond the Dicta: The Seventh 
Amendment Right to Trial by Jury Under Title VII, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1003, 1023–24 
(1990). Indeed, there was some debate about how “automatic” backpay awards could be 
without triggering the right to a jury trial: the less discretionary such awards are, the more 
they sound like damages that should be awarded by a jury. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 442 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“But precisely to the extent 
that an award of backpay is thought to flow as a matter of course from a finding of 
wrongdoing, and thereby becomes virtually indistinguishable from an award for damages, 
the question (not raised by any of the parties, and therefore quite properly not discussed in 
the Court’s opinion), of whether either side may demand a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment becomes critical.”). The issue largely disappeared when the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 made compensatory and punitive damages available in Title VII disparate 
treatment suits, which necessarily entailed the right to a jury trial. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a 
(1991). It remains a possibility for disparate impact cases, which were not reached by this 
amendment, and for which backpay remains the central monetary remedy.  
 29 See CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW & PRACTICE § 13.09, at 853–55 (2009). 
 30 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012). In contrast, the Fair Labor Standards Act used the term 
“unpaid minimum wages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012). 
 31 See, e.g., Rasimas v. Mich. Dep’t of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 625–26 (6th Cir. 
1983) (looking to NLRA precedents to decide a Title VII case); see also Robert S. Fuchs & 
Henry M. Kelleher, The Back-Pay Remedy of the National Labor Relations Board, 9 B.C. 
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 829, 831–35 (1968) (discussing the history of the NLRA’s backpay 
remedy).  
 32 The Board is accorded significant discretion in awarding backpay, See NLRB v. 
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969) (“In fashioning its remedies . . . the 
Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy 
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In any event, Title VII also tells us that, whatever backpay is, “[i]nterim 
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence” must be deducted.33 
This evokes some version of the doctrine of “mitigation of damages” or 
“avoidable consequences,” which is familiar not only from contracts and tort 
law but also across the range of legally-redressable wrongs34 but which means 
numerous sources can be looked to for guidance. However, Congress did not 
speak generally of “mitigation”; instead it spoke of “interim earnings or 
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” Does the choice to avoid a 
common law term suggest a narrower meaning? Maybe a Title VII plaintiff is 
not required to generally mitigate but only to use “reasonable diligence” to 
earn replacement compensation. Or maybe there is no difference between the 
two formulations. 
Interestingly, the NLRA did not speak explicitly to the mitigation 
principle, but, after some confusion as to the extent of the duty, the law 
basically took the “earned or earnable” approach.35 In light of this history, 
perhaps Congress added the mitigation requirement to Title VII precisely to 
avoid a similar interpretive problem under the new statute. Or perhaps its 
grafting of explicit mitigation language on Title VII can be read to suggest that 
Congress was not looking to prior NLRA precedents as necessarily 
establishing the meaning of Title VII. In that case, it would be important for 
Congress to “lock in” doctrines that it did not want to leave to the courts’ 
judgment. Indeed, later amendments to § 706(g) provided more constraints on 
courts in this regard.36 
And what about the “collateral source rule”? The law of torts in 196437 
would not have credited to a proven tortfeasor’s account any recoveries the 
plaintiff had from an “independent source,” such as unemployment 
                                                                                                                     
must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.”). Title VII suits do not 
involve an adjudicating agency, which might suggest that the law developed under the 
NLRA is not necessarily apposite.  
 33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012). 
 34 1 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 3.9, at 380 (“Minimizing damages rules apply in all 
kinds of cases, including contract, tort, and statutory claims.”) (footnotes omitted)).  
 35 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197–98 (1941) (striking down a 
Board policy of not looking to amounts that could have been earned as mitigating the 
backpay amount: “Making the workers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair 
labor practice is part of the vindication of the public policy which the Board 
enforces. Because only actual losses should be made good, it seems fair that deductions 
should be made not only for actual earnings by the worker but also for losses which he 
willfully incurred.”). 
 36 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The addition of § 703(m), providing for 
“motivating factor” liability, was counterbalanced by the simultaneous addition of what is 
now § 706(g)(2), limiting plaintiff’s remedies when defendant can establish that it would 
have made the same decision even had the prohibited consideration not been a motivating 
factor. Id. § 107(b). 
 37 The doctrine was also applied in contract cases. See 3 DOBBS, supra note 23, 
§12.21(2), at 484.  
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insurance.38 In the Title VII context, where lost backpay is often offset by 
unemployment insurance, the question naturally arises whether the amounts so 
recovered should be credited to the defendant. Section 706 does not address 
the collateral source question explicitly (although maybe “earnings” or 
“earnable” suggests a statutory incorporation of the collateral source rule 
because such recoveries are not usually viewed as “earned.”),39 but looking to 
tort law here would be plaintiff-friendly.40 In fact, the courts are split on the 
question under Title VII, but they generally do not deduct unemployment 
compensation from plaintiffs’ backpay recovery.41 
I won’t push this excursion much further. Enough has been said to show 
that the statutory language of § 706(g) is susceptible to a range of 
interpretations, some of which allow the courts to look to other areas of the 
law for the correct answer.42 But the examples also make clear that various 
court responses can be justified by that language because few interpretations 
can be said to be mandated by the statute. For example, it seems hard to argue 
that Congress was so clear in its formulation that the judiciary is required to 
adopt NLRA interpretations of backpay as controlling under Title VII. And the 
avoidance of the traditional “mitigation” language or any direct reference to 
collateral sources suggests that the courts are free to fashion their own 
remedial schemes tailored to the purposes of Title VII. That, however, does 
not mean that they may not look to developments in other areas for guidance. 
IV. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION 
If you are wondering where I’m going, which is a fair question, it’s simply 
this: asking whether tort law (or any other branch of the law) has relevance to 
interpreting the anti-discrimination laws is the wrong question. Of course it 
                                                                                                                     
 38 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 3.8(1), at 372–76. 
 39 Further, developments since 1964 eroding the collateral source rule in torts could 
be argued to be irrelevant because Congress should be taken to have looked to the rule as it 
existed in 1964, not to some evolving version that was unforeseeable at the time. 
 40 However, one could argue that the unemployment insurance is not really an 
“independent” source because the employer typically contributes to the system. 
 41 See Wyatt R. Jansen, Impermissible Windfalls?: Unemployment Insurance, Back 
Pay, and the Two Classes of Title VII Plaintiffs, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 307, 309 (2011) (noting 
that while no circuit requires that such benefits be deducted, and some courts of appeals 
hold that unemployment insurance benefits must be ignored, other circuits “allow[] district 
court judges to consider such benefits in their sound discretion . . . .” In the “discretionary” 
circuits, district courts tend to consider state subrogation rules as part of their analysis.). 
 42 Assuming that Congress has sub silentio referred the courts to the meaning of a 
term at common law, there is also the question of whether Congress intended that meaning 
to be fixed at the time of the referent enactment or wanted it to be able to change as the 
common law changed. The logic of some of the Court’s discussions suggests the former. 
See infra note 69 and accompanying text. In any given situation, however, Congress could 
have intended that a term used in a statute evolve with the developments in the area from 
which it is transplanted. 
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does—or at least may. The real question is when does a statute require or 
permit a court to thumb through the law books looking for an analog to answer 
an interpretive question. And an equally important question is what limits 
might be placed on the potential analogs.  
In turn, this requires us to choose a theory of statutory construction—and 
there are many. Indeed, it is worse than that: as Professor Abbe Gluck has ably 
demonstrated, the Supreme Court—although it regularly deploys theories of 
statutory construction—does not seem to view its precedents as binding with 
respect to its methodology.43 So while it may be true that we are all textualists 
now44 (at least in the sense that we avoid textualist arguments at our peril), it is 
not so clear what stripe of textualism is meant,45 and, in any event, a Court that 
can muster five votes for a purposive interpretation of a particular statute can 
adopt such a rule without viewing itself as “overruling” any prior decision.46 
                                                                                                                     
 43 See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for 
the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 759 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 
YALE L.J. 1898, 1901–02 (2011).  
 44 William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1090 (2001) 
(“We are all textualists.”). “Textualism” is usually used in contradistinction to 
“purposivism.” James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on 
Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 117, 159–60 (2008). The former, as its name suggests, focuses primarily or 
exclusively on the text and structure of the statute to ascertain its meaning; in contrast, 
purposivism looks also to the purposes of Congress in enacting the law. Id. A pure 
textualist might never look to legislative history; a purposivist could easily do so. See id. at 
122 (arguing that liberal justices have moved away from use of legislative history because 
of Justice Scalia’s strong aversion to it); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1887 (2008) (“[I]t appears that several Justices—clearly Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, and perhaps Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy—on 
the Supreme Court now consider themselves textualists.”). But see Jonathan T. Molot, The 
Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (“Textualism has outlived its 
utility as an intellectual movement. . . . Textualists have been so successful discrediting 
strong purposivism, and distinguishing their new brand of ‘modern textualism’ from the 
older, more extreme ‘plain meaning’ school, that they no longer can identify, let alone 
conquer, any remaining territory between textualism’s adherents and nonadherents.”); 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 733 
(2010) (“Textualists have made an important contribution by forcing statutory interpreters 
to take the enacted text seriously; but they have persuaded few, if any, trained in the old 
school that, as the directive force of the statutory text attenuates, one can dispense with a 
comprehensive consideration of legislative purpose in determining statutory meaning.”). 
 45 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1758 
(2010) (arguing that many state courts now use a form of “modified textualism,” which 
ranks interpretive tools in a “strict hierarchy [that] emphasizes textual analysis (step one); 
limits the use of legislative history (only in step two, and only if textual analysis alone does 
not suffice); and dramatically reduces reliance on the oft-used policy presumptions, the 
‘substantive canons’ of interpretation (only in step three, and only if all else fails).”).  
 46 See Dorsey v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012). 
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Statutory interpretations are precedential, but the methodology of interpreting 
is not. 
Perhaps the closest thing to an answer we can hope to find is more-or-less 
definitive evidence that Congress intended to adopt (or reject) a particular 
legal doctrine when it passed an anti-discrimination law. This is most apparent 
when Congress overrides a court decision,47 thus providing strong evidence of 
what it did not want the law to mean (at least prospectively).48 But it is rare to 
find that Congress incorporated other laws by reference. Some examples do 
exist—an obvious one is the ADA’s express incorporation of Title VII’s 
“powers, remedies, and procedures.”49 
A more dramatic and troubling “incorporation by reference” example is 
the Court’s conclusion that the various employment discrimination statutes, 
indeed, almost all federal employment-related statutes, reach only 
“employees” as the common law of agency would have viewed that term—
because that is what Congress must have intended when it used the term.50 
                                                                                                                     
 47 In the employment discrimination context, enactments include the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (2012)) (passed to override General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)). 
See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 962–63 
(2013); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (passed to overturn a number of restrictive Supreme Court 
decisions concerning Title VII); Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (passed to 
override Supreme Court decisions restricting the reach of the ADA); Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 
U.S.C.) (passed to override Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 
(2007)); see also supra text accompanying notes 9–11. 
 48 Even in this setting, there has been some dispute as to the extent to which an 
override should be taken to apply. See Charles A. Sullivan, Response, The Curious 
Incident of Gross and the Significance of Congress’s Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 157, 158 (2012); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of 
Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
511, 513 (2009) [hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents]; Deborah A. Widiss, 
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 859, 860–61 (2012). 
 49 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2012) (“The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in 
sections 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–6, 2000e–8, and 2000e–9 of this title shall be the 
powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the 
Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in 
violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 
of this title, concerning employment.”). Even this language, however, has generated 
controversy. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 319, 340 (6th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (finding Title VII’s mixed-motive causation standard not to be a “power, 
remedy, or procedure”).  
 50 There have been serious critiques of other judicial application of agency law 
principles to employment discrimination, especially in the harassment area. See, e.g., Paula 
1090 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
While this approach can be traced back to federal workers’ compensation law, 
whose connection to torts is obvious, this use or misuse of other sources of law 
in approaching federal statutory construction is both dramatic and long-
standing and as connected to agency law as to tort law.  
The key case is Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,51 which 
interpreted ERISA but has been generally followed as to federal employment 
statutes.52 Darden looked to Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 
(CCNV),53 a copyright case, for the proposition that “[w]here Congress uses 
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a 
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms . . . .”54 Applying that 
principle to the case before it, the Darden Court noted, “[i]n the past, when 
Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded 
that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant 
relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine,” and then applied 
this interpretation to ERISA.55 
That, as we will see, was an overstatement, and at no point did the Darden 
Court mention a competing principle of interpretation—and an obvious one 
has been cited frequently by the Court: Absent any “indication to the contrary, 
words in a statute are assumed to bear their ‘ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning.’”56 So formulated, the canon has been cited eighteen times by the 
Supreme Court,57 but the underlying notion of reading a statute according to 
its common (rather than some more technical) meaning goes back at least to 
1828. In Minor v. Mechanics Bank of Alexandria, the Court stated that “[t]he 
ordinary meaning of the language, must be presumed to be intended [by the 
legislature], unless it would manifestly defeat the object of the provisions.”58 
Indeed, “ordinary meaning” as applied to statutes appears in the United States 
Reports more than 200 times,59 and the Court frequently looks to ordinary 
                                                                                                                     
J. Dalley, All in a Day’s Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment, 104 
W. VA. L. REV. 517, 519–20 (2002). 
 51 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 327‒28 (1992). 
 52 E.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–45 
(2003) (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 322‒23, in determining whether owners of a 
professional corporation were employees). 
 53 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989). 
 54 Darden, 503 U.S. at 322 (alteration in original) (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 739). 
 55 Id. at 322–23 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 739–40). 
 56 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 n.5 (2002) (defining the 
word “occur” for purposes of determining the start of the Title VII filing period). 
 57 I conducted a WestlawNext search on July 19, 2013 in the Supreme Court database 
using the search terms: “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” The search resulted 
in eighteen hits. This language originated in Perrin v. United States where the issue was 
the meaning of bribery in a criminal statute. See 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).  
 58 Minor v. Mechs. Bank of Alexandria, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 46, 64 (1828). 
 59 I conducted a WestlawNext search on July 19, 2013 in the Supreme Court database 
using the search terms: ordinary meaning /p statute. The search resulted in 209 hits.  
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meaning without specifying that that is its methodology. For example, in the 
anti-discrimination context, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. looked to ordinary 
usage to define “substantially” for purposes of determining whether a 
condition constituted a disability by “substantially limiting a major life 
activity.”60  
Indeed, even the casual reader of the United States Reports over the last 
two decades will be struck by how often an opinion begins its statutory 
analysis by citing one of many dictionaries,61 Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary being a favorite.62 Often the definition verges on (or 
crosses over into) the pedantic.63 Just last Term, the Court looked to that 
dictionary in two employment discrimination cases. In University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, it cited a prior decision defining 
“because.”64 And in Vance v. Ball State University, it looked to Webster’s 
Third New International to establish that “[i]n general usage, the term 
‘supervisor’ lacks a sufficiently specific meaning to be helpful for present 
purposes.”65  
The resort to “general dictionaries” necessarily implies a preference for 
“ordinary meaning” over common law meaning, although, admittedly, the 
Court also often cites Black’s Law Dictionary,66 which provides a blend of 
                                                                                                                     
 60 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999). The “ordinary 
meaning” canon, No. 6 in the Scalia and Garner structure, has been described as “the most 
fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012). It is subject to other 
canons, such as No. 53, the “Canon of Imputed Common-Law Meaning.” Id. at 320. But 
the authors are not very clear as to when No. 6 is trumped by No. 53 or vice versa, 
although they do recognize that “[n]ot always is it easy to determine whether ordinary 
meaning or specialized meaning applies.” Id. at 76. 
 61 See e.g., Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a 
Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 
228–30 (1999). 
 62 I conducted a WestlawNext search on July 19, 2013 in the Supreme Court database 
using the search terms: Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. The search resulted 
in 194 hits. The Westlaw Next search of “Oxford English Dictionary” garnered ninety-four 
hits. Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner offer a list of appropriate general and legal 
dictionaries, divided as to time periods relevant to the text to be interpreted. SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 60, app. A, at 415–24. In the Appendix, the authors view the Third 
International definition as “notoriously permissive,” id. at 418, and warn that it is “to be 
used cautiously because of its frequent inclusion of doubtful, slipshod meanings . . . .” Id. 
at 422. 
 63 See e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 659–60 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (debating alternative definitions of “major” in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act’s use of “major life activity”).  
 64 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527 (2013) (citing Gross 
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)).  
 65 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2444 (2013). 
 66 I conducted a WestlawNext search on July 19, 2013 in the Supreme Court database 
using the search terms: Black’s Law Dictionary. The search resulted in 255 hits. 
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technical and general terms.67 In any case, most of the references to Black’s 
are complimented by a reference to a general-purpose dictionary.68 
“Employment” obviously had an “ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning” when the relevant statutes were passed, which certainly did not 
focus on “control” or twelve factors. For example, if we look to the Court’s 
favorite dictionaries, “employment” has a number of definitions, but none that 
requires “control.” For instance, the Oxford English Dictionary defines 
employment as “[a] person’s regular occupation; a trade or profession,”69 and 
“employee” as “a person employed for wages.”70 As for Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary, it defines the term employment simply as “work (as 
customary trade, craft, service, or vocation) in which one’s labor or services 
are paid for by an employer.”71  
This, of course, raises the question why Darden (or CCNV) looked to a 
more technical, common law meaning. It can scarcely be enough that the term 
has both ordinary and technical meanings—the point of the “ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning” canon is precisely to privilege the latter. 
Recently, in Sekhar v. United States,72 Justice Scalia suggested a more focused 
rationale for the canon, but one which does not explain the Court’s choice of 
canon regarding “employment.” Quoting both a Justice Frankfurter law review 
article,73 and a prior decision,74 he suggested that the common law definition 
was appropriate when “a word is obviously transplanted from another source” 
or is a “term of art” accumulating “the legal tradition and meaning of centuries 
of practice.” The term at issue in Sekhar was “‘extortion,’ one of the oldest 
crimes in our legal tradition,” but obviously this rationale for looking to the 
common law definition is inapplicable to “employment.” 
                                                                                                                     
 67 Indeed, it could scarcely be otherwise because, as this discussion shows, the “legal” 
meaning of a term is often also its ordinary meaning. 
 68 There were 111 references to a Webster’s Dictionary and twenty-three references to 
the Oxford English Dictionary in those cases citing Black’s Law Dictionary. See supra 
note 62. 
 69 Employment Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/61378?redirectedFrom=employment#eid (last visited Sept. 13, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YLD4-683J. 
 70 Employee Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/61374 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KH9D-2UBZ. 
 71 Employment Definition, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 743 
(2002). 
 72 Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724 (2013).  
 73 Id. (“[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the 
common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.”) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, 
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947))). 
 74 Id. (“Where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal 
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster 
of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it 
was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise 
instructed.”) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952))). 
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Nor does a search for the precedential origins of the agency meaning 
approach provide any real answers. As we saw, Darden looked to CCNV,75 
and CCNV, in turn, supported its conclusion with a variety of citations, several 
of which do not justify looking to the common law definition of “employee.” 
The earliest decision cited by CCNV was Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. 
Co., which, in interpreting Federal Employee’s Liability Act (FELA),76 noted 
that “[w]e are of the opinion that Congress used the words ‘employé’ and 
‘employed’ in the statute in their natural sense, and intended to describe the 
conventional relation of employer and employé.”77 “Natural sense” sounds 
more like ordinary, contemporary, common meaning than common law 
agency.78 
In 1959 in Baker v. Texas & Pacific Railroad Co.,79 the Court focused 
more precisely on what legal principles governed the employment relationship, 
concluding that FELA “does not use the terms ‘employee’ and ‘employed’ in 
any special sense, so that the familiar general legal problems as to whose 
‘employee’ or ‘servant’ a worker is at a given time present themselves as 
matters of federal law under the Act.”80 This seems to point two ways at once: 
no “special sense” contrasting with “general legal problem[].”81 The Court did 
not elaborate on the factors going into the determination other than to list some 
considerations, including “directive control” by an admitted railroad employee 
and its furnishing of materials.82 However, in the course of holding the 
question to be ordinarily one for the jury, the Court did cite the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency,83 presumably because it reflected the common law on the 
question, which, again, would guide the judicial determination of what is 
federal law.  
                                                                                                                     
 75 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 76 35 Stat. 65, 65–66 (1908) (federal workers’ compensation statute for railroad 
workers). 
 77 Robinson v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915) (emphasis added). 
 78 In any event, the Robinson Court wrote not to distinguish an employee from, say, 
an independent contractor, but rather to determine whether an employee of another 
company (the Pullman Company) was an employee of the defendant. Id. (“It was well 
known that there were on interstate trains persons engaged in various services for other 
masters. Congress, familiar with this situation, did not use any appropriate expression 
which could be taken to indicate a purpose to include such persons among those to whom 
the railroad company was to be liable under the Act.”); see also Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 
U.S. 318, 322–25 (1974) (explaining that plaintiff was not the employee of one railroad 
when injured but rather remained an employee of another railroad). 
 79 Baker v. Tex. & Pac. R.R. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (per curiam) (citing 
Robinson, 237 U.S. at 94). 
 80 Id. (citing Robinson, 237 U.S. at 94). 
 81 Id. (emphasis added). 
 82 Id. at 228–29. 
 83 See id. at 228 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. c, § 227, cmt. 
a (1958)). 
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In short, the question was radically under-theorized in the FELA cases. 
The issue was one of federal law because it concerned the meaning of a federal 
statute, and the definition was based on a finding (or better, an assumption) 
about what Congress intended. By the time of CCNV, however, the preference 
for a common law meaning had developed into an express presumption: In 
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Division of Amax, the Court laid down a general 
principle: “Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning 
under either equity or the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute 
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning 
of these terms.”84 Although Amax did not involve the meaning of 
“employment,” the CCNV Court drew on this approach to look to the common 
law meaning of employee in construing the Copyright Act’s recognition of 
employer ownership of “work made for hire.”85 And, pushing the question 
further, CCNV for the first time defined the common law test by looking to the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency’s factors.86  
Given this theoretical basis, it is not surprising that when the question 
arose of the meaning of “employee” in other statutes, ranging from Title VII to 
the Americans with Disabilities Act87 to ERISA,88 these two principles 
became controlling: first, federal law adopted the common law, and, second, 
the common law was reflected in the Restatement. Although the Court 
purported to look first to the language of the statute in question to see if it 
required a different result, the definitions tend to be “completely circular,”89 
thus leaving no basis for the Court to find that the law “otherwise dictates” a 
result at odds with the common law.90  
                                                                                                                     
 84 NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 337‒38 (1981) (holding that employer 
representatives in a statutorily-authorized trust fund were simply fiduciaries for the 
beneficiaries and did not create union interference or violate labor laws). 
 85 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 732 (1989) (construing the 
Copyright Act of 1976 in the case of a “work made for hire”). 
 86 Id. at 751–52 (explaining Restatement factors). 
 87 See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 
n.5 (2003) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)) 
(establishing factors for determining whether owners of a business are also employees for 
purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act). But see Frank J. Menetrez, Employee 
Status and the Concept of Control in Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 63 SMU L. 
REV. 137, 148–49, 158–59 (2010) (criticizing Clackamas for the misapplication of 
principles the Court purported to be applying). 
 88 See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (“ERISA’s nominal definition of ‘employee’ as ‘any 
individual employed by an employer[]’ is completely circular and explains nothing. As for 
the rest of the Act, Darden does not cite, and we do not find, any provision either giving 
specific guidance on the term’s meaning or suggesting that construing it to incorporate 
traditional agency law principles would thwart the congressional design or lead to absurd 
results. Thus, we adopt a common-law test for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ 
under ERISA . . . .”) (citation omitted)). 
 89 See id. (explaining that an employee is someone employed by an employer).  
 90 Id. at 322. 
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At no point in this line of cases did the Court pause to explain why it 
chose the technical meaning over the “ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning,” most likely an outcome-determinative decision in a huge swath of 
cases. Further, Amax and CCNV both recognized that the presumption was 
rebuttable, and in fact CCNV “cf.” cited NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 
which it described as “rejecting agency law conception of employee for 
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act where structure and context of 
statute indicated broader definition.”91  
The Hearst case is the seminal labor law decision concerning the status of 
newsboys as employees, but our concern is with the Court’s methodology 
rather than its result. Compare the opening paragraph of the Hearst 
Publications discussion with the Amax approach: 
Whether, given the intended national uniformity, the term “employee” 
includes such workers as these newsboys must be answered primarily from 
the history, terms and purposes of the legislation. The word “is not treated by 
Congress as a word of art having a definite meaning . . . .” Rather “it takes 
color from its surroundings . . . [in] the statute where it appears,” and derives 
meaning from the context of that statute, which “must be read in the light of 
the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.”92  
The Court’s result—to find newsboys covered by the statute—was soon 
overturned by an amendment to the NLRA,93 but the Court’s purposive 
approach to statutory construction was not necessarily repudiated.94 And at 
least an occasional lower court resorted to the Hearst methodology rather than 
the Amax presumption in construing “employee” under other statutes.  
A good example is Armbruster v. Quinn, a Sixth Circuit decision which 
rejected reading the term “in a technical sense, divorced from the broadly 
humanitarian goals of the Act.”95 Looking to Hearst, it found “no tacit 
dichotomy between employees and ‘independent contractors’ enshrined in 
Title VII.”96 One of its reasons was that “the framers of Title VII specifically 
                                                                                                                     
 91 Reid, 490 U.S. at 740 (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124–32 
(1944)). 
 92 Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Richard 
R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought 
to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 321‒23 (2001). 
 93 See Carlson, supra note 92, at 322.  
 94 One might argue to the contrary that Congress’s intervention to cut back on the 
Court’s expansive interpretation of the NLRA should be carried over to suggest a similar 
narrow reading of Title VII. Deborah Widiss has argued that a legislative override should 
not be read grudgingly but rather expansively as applied to related statutes. See Widiss, 
Shadow Precedents, supra note 48, at 581–82. While her examples deal mainly with 
legislative reversals of judicial restrictions on the anti-discrimination laws, a neutral 
application of her views would justify application of the Taft-Hartley rule to later 
enactments, absent congressional indications to the contrary in those enactments. See id. 
 95 Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1341 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 96 Id.  
1096 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
used the NLRA as their model,”97 and the NLRA had been amended to 
overturn Hearst to exclude independent contractors: 
This amendment was on the books before Title VII was formulated and 
yet Congress incorporated no similar provision into Title VII. In that 
Congress was specifically aware of the judicial construction accorded the 
term “employee” absent an explicit limitation, we now refuse to imply such a 
restriction into the otherwise broad terms of Title VII.98  
While Armbruster’s approach has not prevailed under the anti-
discrimination statutes,99 it illustrates that an alternative to the presumptive 
common law definition could easily be constructed, even absent statutory 
language explicitly addressing the question.100 
V. BACK TO TORTS 
The point, then, is that resort to torts, agency, or any other body of law to 
inform the interpretation of a particular statutory command depends in the first 
instance on a court’s approach to statutory interpretation, which in turn 
depends on a court’s general methodology, including the choice of canons and 
choosing textualist or purposivist theories. Secondly, to the extent that this 
initial pass requires a court to look to other areas of the law, the ultimate 
reading will likely turn on how faithful the court is to the area which it is 
examining.101 Third, to the extent that the initial pass permits a court to seek 
guidance elsewhere, there remains the issue of what principles should govern 
the selection of analogies, and it is here that we might expect some purposive 
possibilities to creep back into the analysis.102 But as we shall see, 
purposivism is not necessarily plaintiff-friendly. 
                                                                                                                     
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 The Sixth Circuit itself backed away from reading Armbruster broadly, essentially 
finding that the economic realities test it adopted was the same as the control test of 
Darden. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 442–43 (6th Cir. 1996); see also 
Eyerman v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., 967 F.2d 213, 218–19 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 100 The Fair Labor Standards Act is another example of federal employment regulation 
that could depart from the common law definition, but the FLSA’s statutory language 
easily justifies a broader approach. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), (g) (2012); see also Rutherford 
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–29 (1947).  
While the FLSA, like ERISA, defines an “employee” to include “any individual 
employed by an employer,” it defines the verb “employ” expansively to mean “suffer 
or permit to work.” This latter definition, whose striking breadth we have previously 
noted, stretches the meaning of “employee” to cover some parties who might not 
qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (citations omitted).  
 101 See Menetrez, supra note 87, at 158. 
            102 The Court is occasionally candid about modifying common law principles to 
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Although much has been written about the “causation” question,103 it is 
not so clear to me that the problems most commentators identify (too high a 
barrier to plaintiffs’ recovery) stem from the Court looking to torts law for 
guidance; in my view, the problem is its choice of which tort law to look to. 
The operative word in Title VII connecting the prohibited discriminatory 
motivation and what’s come to be called “an adverse employment action”104 is 
“because,” a term that is scarcely self-defining. But by the time the Supreme 
Court first focused on its meaning under Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins in 1989, there was an elaborate jurisprudence on causation—mostly 
developed in the torts context105—but appearing in all sorts of other legal 
settings.106 Further, if the meaning of “because” is to be traced back to what it 
might have meant in tort law in 1964, the differences by 1989 were not 
profound.  
Basically speaking, torts requires but-for causation between the wrong and 
the injury, which is frequently denominated “cause-in-fact” (as we will see, it 
also requires proximate causation in negligence cases). However, tort law 
finds but-for causation established in “over-determined” cases, that is, a 
                                                                                                                     
achieve statutory aims. The most obvious example in the discrimination area is the 
alternation of ordinary agency principles for sexual harassment liability in Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 
(1998). See generally Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General Common Law for 
Employment in an Age of Statutes (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Public Law & Legal Theory 
Paper No. 14-64, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2511265. 
 103 See supra note 3; see also Brian S. Clarke, A Better Route Through the Swamp: 
Causal Coherence in Disparate Treatment Doctrine, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 755–67 
(2013); Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. 
FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 105‒07 (2010); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 
857, 860–67 (2010); Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making 
Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 495‒511 (2006) 
[hereinafter Katz, Making Sense]; Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving 
Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1243, 1254 (2008).  
 104 See SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 29, § 2.02, at 59–64. 
 105 See Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causation and Damages, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 679‒80 (2006); David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1007‒08 
(2009). 
 106 For example, contract breaches do not (1) require causation to recover nominal 
damages; or (2) presume causation when “general damages” (typically, the difference 
between contract price and either market price or cover/resale price are sought); but (3) do 
require the plaintiff to prove causation to recover “consequential” damages. See 3 DOBBS, 
supra note 23, § 12.4(2), at 65–69. That seems to mean but-for cause, although contracts 
also has a doctrine analogous to proximate cause for consequential damages in its 
requirement that such damages be foreseeable. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. 
Rep. 145, 151; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (1981) 
(“Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to 
foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.”). 
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tortfeasor can be liable even if another cause would have also brought about 
the same result.107 At this level of generality, it is hard to fault a Title VII 
court for looking to tort law for guidance on the meaning of “because”—either 
due to implicit congressional “incorporation by using terms with a settled 
common law meaning” or simply because a court must look somewhere.  
Price Waterhouse is unobjectionable in applying torts causation. All nine 
justices across the four separate opinions agreed that but-for causation was 
required for liability, but six justices (the plurality and two separate 
concurrences) would have shifted the burden of proving the absence of but-for 
causation to the defendant when (under somewhat different standards for the 
three opinions concurring in the result) the plaintiff showed that bias was 
involved in the decision. At that point, those three opinions agreed that the 
defendant could avoid liability by showing that it would have made the same 
decision anyway.108 This was plaintiff-friendly, but Congress doubled down in 
this regard by altering the causation structure of Title VII in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 to make proof of “motivating factor” sufficient for liability by 
adding § 703(m);109 Congress simultaneously retained the notion of but-for 
causation for full recovery while shifting the burden of proof of no but-for 
causation to defendant by adding § 706(g)(1).110  
In other words, the plaintiff can prove a violation by showing that a 
prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in a decision. Such a showing 
will also shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show no but-for 
causation, which would limit the plaintiff’s remedies but not avoid liability of 
the defendant. But the congressional amendment does not change the reality 
that the Court devised a causation structure for Title VII claims that drew from 
torts law while being sensitive to proof problems of the somewhat different 
wrong that the statute addressed—not a wrongful act as such but rather a 
wrongful motivation for acts (hiring, firing, demotion) that are endemic to the 
workplace. Indeed, given the amorphousness of the “motivating-factor” 
standard (what level of causation is necessary for a factor that doesn’t 
                                                                                                                     
 107 This is also described as “multiple sufficient cause,” which means that each cause 
would have brought about the same result had the other cause not been present. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2010) 
(“If multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause of 
the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is regarded as 
a factual cause of the harm.”). A similar principle can be found in contract law. See 3 
DOBBS, supra note 23, § 12.4(2), at 66–68. 
 108 See SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 29, § 2.03[D], at 69. 
 109 Civil Rights Act of 1991, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 102-106, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 
1074–75 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)). 
 110 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003). But see Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173, 180 (2009) (holding that § 703(m) does not apply to 
ADEA); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (holding that 
§ 703(m) does not apply to Title VII retaliation cases); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075–76 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012)). 
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necessarily have any effect on a decision?),111 Price Waterhouse may have 
gone about as far as a court could sensibly go without further guidance by 
Congress. 
And, in any event, the bottom line is that Price Waterhouse was a pretty 
plaintiff-friendly decision that drew on torts principles for its rationale. In 
contrast, the Court’s more recent decisions in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services112 and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,113 
essentially overturned Price Waterhouse when the Court found that §§ 703(m) 
and 706(g)(1) do not control.  
The Gross Court held that “because” in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) requires but-for causation with no burden 
shifting;114 Nassar held the same for Title VII retaliation suits (governed by a 
different statutory section than discrimination claims).115 Both are problematic 
in various ways, especially Nassar’s schizophrenic reading of two provisions 
of the same statute and “distinguishing” a line of precedent that equated 
retaliation with discrimination.116 But perhaps the most striking aspect of the 
two decisions is their dismissal of Price Waterhouse, which, as the presumably 
proper interpretation of “because” in Title VII as originally enacted, would 
have seemed to govern the use of the same word in another section of that 
statute117 (Nassar) and in a statute modeled on Title VII (Gross). 
                                                                                                                     
 111 I have previously argued, with regard to “motivating factor,” that: 
[I]f applied over time, the factor would influence an appreciable number of decisions 
regardless of whether the decision at issue was affected. An appropriate metaphor 
might be the adding of weights to runners in a race. The added weight might not affect 
any given race but, over a large number of races, would result in handicapped 
competitors losing disproportionately.  
Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1438. Dean Martin Katz frames it as “minimal causation,” a 
factor that has “some causal weight[,] . . . some tendency to influence the event 
in . . . question but still not rise to the level of necessity or sufficiency . . . .” Katz, Making 
Sense, supra note 102, at 498–99.  
 112 Gross, 557 U.S. at 173, 180. 
 113 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534. 
 114 Gross, 557 U.S. at 180. 
 115 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533‒34. 
 116 The majority read § 703(m) providing that “[a]n unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other 
factors also motivated the practice[,]” as reaching only discrimination claims brought under 
§ 703(a), not retaliation claims brought under § 704(a). Id. at 2526. To do so, it had to 
distinguish a line of precedent, reaching back to Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 
U.S. 229, 235 n.3, 237, 250 n.23 (1969) (holding that retaliation for opposing 
discrimination on a prohibited ground was itself discrimination on that ground). See 
Zimmer, supra note 12, at 712‒13. 
 117 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 258 (2008) (describing 
the Court’s “usual preference for construing the ‘same terms [to] have the same meaning in 
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 What is more important for our purposes, however, is that Gross and 
Nassar essentially chose the causation approach of the dissent in Price 
Waterhouse over that of five of the six justices concurring in the result.118 The 
plurality, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence,119 and the dissent in Price 
Waterhouse all looked to tort law for their rationale, which underscores that, to 
the extent that the results are objectionable, it is not because torts is a source of 
inspiration but because, as is often the case, one searching for support in an 
area of law can usually find what one is looking for.  
The majority’s ability to find what it wants by simply looking for it is 
underscored by Justice Breyer’s dissent (joined by Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg) in Gross, which pointed out a different, approach that would have 
applied tort doctrine sensitive to the differences between the ordinary 
negligence setting in which it evolved and the quite different scenario in the 
typical employment discrimination case. He began by noting that “[t]he words 
‘because of’ do not inherently require a showing of ‘but-for’ causation, and I 
see no reason to read them to require such a showing.”120 He went on to argue 
that: 
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for” 
causation. In that context, reasonably objective scientific or commonsense 
theories of physical causation make the concept of “but-for” causation 
comparatively easy to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an 
entirely different matter to determine a “but-for” relation when we consider, 
not physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that constitute 
motive. Sometimes we speak of determining or discovering motives, but 
more often we ascribe motives, after an event, to an individual in light of the 
individual’s thoughts and other circumstances present at the time of 
decision.121 
                                                                                                                     
different sections of the same statute’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Barnhill v. 
Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 406 (1992))). 
 118 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 409 U.S. 228, 258–60 (1989) (White, J., concurring) 
(citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)) 
(looking to a constitutional decision which had adopted a burden-shifting approach rather 
than relying on tort principles).  
 119 This is most obvious in Justice O’Connor’s opinion: “[I]n multiple causation cases, 
where a breach of duty has been established, the common law of torts has long shifted the 
burden of proof to multiple defendants to prove that their negligent actions were not the 
‘but-for’ cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at 263 (O’Connor, J., concurring). But Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion is also clearly speaking of torts when it considers the 
“overdetermined” causation of “two physical forces [that] act upon and move an object 
[when] either force acting alone would have moved the object.” Id. at 241. 
 120 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 121 Id. at 190–91. He explained: 
In a case where we characterize an employer’s actions as having been taken out of 
multiple motives, say, both because the employee was old and because he wore loud 
clothing, to apply “but-for” causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what 
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Breyer would have permitted a plaintiff to prevail by showing that a 
forbidden consideration played a role in a challenged decision, but noted that 
“the law need not automatically assess liability in these circumstances,” and he 
approved Price Waterhouse’s recognition of “an affirmative defense where the 
defendant could show that the employee would have been dismissed 
regardless.”122 He explained: 
The law permits the employer this defense, not because the forbidden 
motive, age, had no role in the actual decision, but because the employer can 
show that he would have dismissed the employee anyway in the hypothetical 
circumstance in which his age-related motive was absent. And it makes sense 
that this would be an affirmative defense, rather than part of the showing of a 
violation, precisely because the defendant is in a better position than the 
plaintiff to establish how he would have acted in this hypothetical situation. I 
can see nothing unfair or impractical about allocating the burdens of proof in 
this way.123 
The point is not that Justice Breyer was “correct” in so concluding, 
although he persuaded me, but rather that reasonable minds can reach radically 
different answers even when answering a supposed textualist question. 
Much the same could be said for that other tort causation chestnut, 
proximate cause. In torts, proximate cause operates in the negligence context 
and its role is to narrow liability as compared to what but-for cause would 
allow.124 That is clearly how the Court deployed the concept in connection 
with the anti-discrimination laws in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.125 But, as I 
have explored elsewhere, the major problem is not looking to tort law per se 
but misapplying proximate cause, both in terms of its application to intentional 
torts and the Court’s choice of the flavor of proximate cause to deploy. 
Speaking of Staub and recent decisions in other contexts, I wrote:  
These decisions reflect the Court’s desire to invoke proximate cause to 
inject liability-limiting factors into the analysis. But they seem to do so as a 
means of validating what are essentially policy decisions under the guise of 
straightforward applications of traditional tort principles. . . . [N]ot only do 
such cases wrench proximate cause from its negligence moorings, but also 
                                                                                                                     
would have happened if the employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been 
different. The answer to this hypothetical inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, 
since the employee likely knows less than does the employer about what the employer 
was thinking at the time, the employer will often be in a stronger position than the 
employee to provide the answer.  
Id. at 191.  
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 191–92 (citation omitted). 
 124 See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1459–67. 
 125 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011). 
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they choose Judge Andrews’ strain of proximate cause, which is distinctly in 
the minority among the common-law courts.126 
I would go further and argue that the Staub Court should have entirely 
rejected proximate clause in favor of but-for cause only. If bias influences an 
employment decision (whether by a manager, a co-worker or even a third 
party), it would scarcely be an extreme reading of the statute to say that the 
decision was “because of” discrimination.127 And the Court could have done 
so by various avenues. First, the statute permits a purely textualist reading, 
unaffected by the gingerbread that various areas of the law might have layered 
on it. But it seems also to permit the Court to look to tort law for the meaning 
of “because.” The problem, then, is that Title VII does not require the Court to 
ignore proximate cause in favor of pure but-for analysis. Similarly, unlike the 
amended version of Title VII, the ADEA does not require the Court to 
ameliorate the problems of but-for causation by allowing a shifting of burdens 
on the question, thus allowing the Court to root around among the available 
doctrines for a liability-limiting principle. 
VI. A BETTER CLASS OF LAWGIVERS? 
This analysis is leading to an unpleasant reality. Lester Maddox, the 
segregationist governor of Georgia, when responding to concerns about the 
state of Georgia’s prisons, is reported to have said that he had done all he 
could and further improvements would require “a better class of prisoners.”128 
We seem to need a better class of either Congress or courts.  
With respect to better legislative drafting and even putting aside the 
electoral politics of Congress, it seems hard to imagine, say, the 1964 
Congress forecasting the kinds of interpretive challenges Title VII posed over 
the years, much less coming up with ways to address them through drafting. 
And, of course, the politics of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act were 
unlikely to have permitted much leeway even had the problems and solutions 
presented themselves. It is true that the 1991 Congress had more reason to 
                                                                                                                     
 126 Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1467. 
 127 It is, in fact, hard to see any room for doubts about proximate cause in the facts in 
Staub because the lower level supervisors had the motivation to cause the plaintiff to be 
fired because of his military service, the intent, in that their acts could cause such an 
adverse action, and success in that effort. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194.  
[T]he Court’s expansive definition of intent largely seems to subsume any separate 
inquiry since the “substantially certain” consequence of an act, much less a desired 
consequence, seems necessarily proximate to the act itself. In short, once the Court 
was willing to find that a lower-level supervisor’s intent could result in employer 
liability, it could easily have relied on cause-in-fact rather than proximate cause.  
Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1457–58. 
 128 See William McPherson, A Better Class of Prisoner, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1984, at 
A19. 
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anticipate many interpretive problems, perhaps most obviously its failure to 
frame § 703(m) to include retaliation cases and its failure to amend the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act to add an analogous section. While 
envisioning those interpretive difficulties was easier, perhaps the delicate 
political balance that proponents and opponents struck precluded such 
precision, thus leaving the courts free to strike their own balance.  
Much the same can be said of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which 
expands the time limits for challenging pay discrimination under Title VII and 
the other anti-discrimination laws.129 As I have explored elsewhere,130 the 
statute—although in many ways sweeping131—contains an ambiguity as to 
whether it reaches only “compensation” decisions (whatever they are) or any 
decisions affecting compensation. It is scarcely surprising that those circuits 
weighing in so far have taken a narrower view. So, for example, a promotion 
decision is not a compensation decision, although most promotions entail a 
raise in compensation.132  
In this example, some would say, the freedom of the courts to choose 
among various possibilities is exactly the courts’ job when Congress can’t 
articulate a clear rule.  
There may be more hope with respect to the Americans with Disabilities 
Amendment Act of 2008,133 although it is too early to be sure.134 If there is, it 
                                                                                                                     
 129 Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3(B), 123 Stat. 5, 6 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) 
(2012)). 
 130 See generally Sullivan, supra note 11, at 549‒54. 
 131 It amends a large number of statutes and applies retroactively. See id. at 549–50; 
see also Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 48, at 534–36. 
 132 See Almond v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 665 F.3d 1174, 1175 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(“[D]iscrimination in compensation” addresses “situations in which a member of a 
protected class receives less pay than similarly situated colleagues—that is, unequal pay for 
equal work. Because the plaintiffs in this case don’t raise an unequal pay for equal work 
claim, they do not benefit from the Act’s comparatively generous deadlines and preexisting 
accrual rules apply.”); Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (holding that a denial of a promotion with continuing effects on plaintiff’s 
compensation is not actionable because “discrimination in compensation means paying 
different wages or providing different benefits to similarly situated employees, not 
promoting one employee but not another to a more remunerative position”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Noel v. Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 275 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding 
that plaintiff’s failure to promote claim was not saved by the Fair Pay Act, at least where 
plaintiff had not characterized it as a failure to give a raise until late in the proceedings). 
 133 See Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 29 
and 42 U.S.C.) 
 134 Early analyses suggest that the statute has been largely successful in its primary aim 
of expanding the cramped approach to the disability question that characterized judicial 
decisions. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the 
ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2050–57 (2013) (gathering 
empirical evidence so far reveals more decisions on the “qualified” issue, fewer dismissals 
for the plaintiff not being disabled, and more plaintiff success in surviving various 
motions); Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 
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may well be that the reasons are political rather than technical because the 
ADAAA was passed with overwhelming margins and signed by a Republican 
president.135 But even such a broadly supported enactment posed interpretive 
problems for its proponents. Although passed to overturn restrictive Supreme 
Court decisions as to what constitutes a disability,136 the statute contained no 
new definition of the key adjective “substantially” for purposes of when an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Instead Congress, 
although disapproving the existing EEOC regulation,137 directed the EEOC to 
revise its regulations in a manner consistent with the purposes of the 
amendments. The agency, in turn, also opted not to define “substantially 
limits” but instead issued nine “rules of construction” to be used in construing 
the enactment.138 While this may well be “good enough for government 
work,”139 it illustrates the difficulties of congressional agreement even on 
principles for which there is, at one level of generality, a consensus. 
But the idea of “rules of construction” is not without merit in its own right. 
I have suggested elsewhere that Congress might try to take back some of the 
ground the Court has wrested from it.140 For example, Congress could instruct 
                                                                                                                     
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 38, 64), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399724 (discussing empirical study showing courts are 
generally following the ADAAA’s command to be more receptive to claims of disability 
but that while they are receptive to physical reasonable accommodations addressing actual 
functions of a job, there are signs of backlash when it comes to requests for 
accommodations that relate to “structural norms in the workplace”). 
 135 See Paul R. Klein, Note, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: The Pendulum Swings 
Back, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 467, 475 (2010) (“In the House, the ADAAA passed by an 
overwhelming margin, with 402 voting in favor of passage and 17 voting against it. The 
Senate followed suit, unanimously voting for its passage.”). 
 136 The ADAAA’s Findings and Purposes provide in part:  
(4) the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471 (1999) and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection 
intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals 
whom Congress intended to protect; 
(5) the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, 
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed the broad scope of protection 
intended to be afforded by the ADA.  
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4)–(5), 122 Stat. 3553. 
 137 Congress found the EEOC’s regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), “to require a greater 
degree of limitation than was intended by Congress . . . .” Id. § 2(a)(7). 
 138 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2014). 
 139 Urban Dictionary defines this idiom as “[p]robably not the best, but what the hell, 
at least we got the job done to minimally acceptable standards.” Good Enough for 
Government Work Definition, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/ 
define.php?term=good%20enough%20for%20government%20work (last visited Aug. 20, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/D3E5-G9AH. 
 140 See Charles A. Sullivan, Remarks, Reviving Employee Rights? Recent and 
Upcoming Employment Discrimination Legislation: Proceedings of the 2010 Annual 
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the courts to look to a statute’s legislative history (perhaps the relevant House 
and Senate reports) in interpreting some or all statutes.141 It could also instruct 
the courts, as the ADAAA does, in how to interpret its statutes, either for 
particular enactments or more generally. Those who favor such an approach to 
taming the courts could, for example, seek to inject purposivist analysis into 
what is now a textualist exercise. While I generally see few conceptual 
problems in such an approach,142 it is admittedly largely untried but, if 
successful, it would reinvest Congress with some of the power that has been 
taken away from it without at the same time requiring Congress to write better 
laws.  
 Of course, maybe this device will fail precisely because the courts can 
claim they are construing a statute when in fact they are rewriting it. That 
leads us to the question of a better class of courts. I’ll save that for another 
day. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Employment 
Discrimination Law, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 355, 375, 380 (2010). 
 141 The only example of which I am aware is of a congressional instruction regarding 
legislative history is in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provides that “[n]o statements 
other than the interpretive memorandum . . . shall be considered legislative history of, or 
relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of 
this Act that relates to Wards Cove—Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business 
practice.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 103 Stat. 1071, 1075 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2012)). This is less an authorization of the 
use of legislative history than a prohibition on resort to most traditional sources. See 
Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 488 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting an 
interpretive argument because “the Act precludes us from considering the legislative 
history upon which this argument relies for support.”). 
 142 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkrantz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086‒90 (2002); Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law 
of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 361–62 (2010). There may be constitutional objections 
when the Congress legislates to overturn constitutionally-based canons. See Linda D. 
Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory 
Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 837, 840 (2009) (“The 
legislature may legitimately try to influence the interpretive outcome to promote specific 
policy choices. However, when attempting to control the interpretive process without 
regard for policy choices, the legislature aggrandizes itself and violates separation of 
powers.”). Further, Justice Scalia has argued that committee reports may not be generated 
until a statute has already passed. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–100 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). There may be a delegation problem in these instances, but that 
problem would not be present when a report is available before the vote. As for the 
argument that Congress would somehow be intruding on the judicial function, it is hard to 
see why instructing the courts on where to look for a statute’s meaning is any more 
problematic than the Dictionary Act. See 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 7) (considering the 
constitutionality of the Dictionary Act’s definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” for more 
than a thousand federal laws). 

